National Flag of India and the United States of America side by side in front of an official building.

Diplomatic glasses were rosy. The substance is the starting point for work.

It was always going to be showbiz. Four days, three cities, a visit to the house of Mother Teresa in Kolkata, a leisurely walk through the Amber Fort in Jaipur with his secretary's wife, an excursion to the Taj and the usual finalizations that Donald Trump is a 'big fan' of Narendra Modi. The first time that Marco Rubio has visited India as Secretary of State, he has brought a script that is obviously written by an administration that knows that there is a problem. The Trump administration has sent its top diplomat to do something that the relationship badly needed to do: stop talking down to India in public after a year of bruised pride, public lectures, punitive tariffs and an awkward American embrace of Pakistan's army chief.

Warmth which must be performed is not the same as warmth which is. That this was a visit in "repair" mode, after a year of nosediving ties, is what a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations bluntly stated in the days before Rubio's visit. The larger issue then, is not, did the photos turn out well? They did. Whether anything below has really moved is the question.

“weeks away” from a trade deal on whose terms?

The most tangible thing that came out of the visit was Rubio's comment on Monday that the bilateral trade pact is at "very final details" and could be signed in "weeks, not months. That's an important message. Sources with first-hand knowledge of the talks say the negotiators have made progress on industrial tariffs and on a part of the agricultural file, leaving only issues of dairy access, GM corn and soymeal and the politically sensitive issue of the possibility of fixing a hard cap on Russian crude.

It is important to know the size of the swing, in order to remember where we were nine months ago. Under the 50 percent reciprocal tariff imposed by the United States on India, the world's largest democracy was being penalized with a 25 percent surcharge on Russian oil purchases. Ironically, China was paying nothing extra for the same barrels. That was reduced to 18 percent when the framework was implemented on 6 February because the Indians pledged to purchase at least 50 percent of their energy, technology and farm products from the Americans over the next five years and to phase out Russian crude.

The landing point of the trade wind.

Tariff Escalation Impact on Indian exports to the US by sector (2025-26 Estimate)

Note: Industry estimates derived from the commentary from FIEO, GTRI and CRISIL on the 50% tariff window.

In theory, a climbdown. In reality, it meant that India would be paying a tariff even higher than the 15 per cent paid by the European Union, Japan and Britain. The figures of Indian merchandise trade deficit illustrate the price these months came at for the export economy: it surged to nearly $35 billion in January 2026, the highest monthly figure on record since October. No one of the textile clusters of Tiruppur, gem and jewellery exporters in Surat, marine product sellers from Andhra Pradesh got those orders back. The 18 percent number is well taken under Rubio's arm but it's not a victory. It's damage control.

“Trump's modus operandi is to create an artificial crisis, claim a victory, and then demand a “thank you.” India has won some breathing room, but not respect.”

The Rawalpindi problem won't go away

There's the Pakistan thing, which Rubio was unable to talk his way out of in three days. When PK asked at the joint press conference with S. Jaishankar if the U.S. involvement with the Pakistani military was jeopardizing India, he responded with the familiar talking point that Washington's relations with other countries are not at the cost of its strategic partnership with India. On the tarmac the next day, before heading out on his mission, he admitted that India is always "referring to the fact that there are armed terrorist groups operating from Pakistani territory"a line any honest American diplomat could have written a decade ago, but not from this man's administration as it was just treating Field Marshal Asim Munir as Washington's favorite South Asian general.

That was the one thing no one in the room dared call the name of. According to Trump's tally, he has mentioned his May 2025 ceasefire he personally brokered over 60 times in 6 countries. India has politely but firmly denied any third party involvement each time, claiming the suspension of Operation Sindoor was a "hotline" call from the DGMO office in Pakistan to the Indian counterpart. The disconnect is significant because any time Rubio spouts the Trump talking point about peacemaking he, whether through ignorance or by design, is affirming a falsehood that equates India and Pakistan in moral terms. That's exactly what New Delhi has been trying to break for two decades and why a top Congress leader recently coined a catchy phrase: “Modi-Trump ‘huglomacy’ is in deep freeze.”

The Munir factor and the F-16 reminder

Those who have been following this story closely will have not forgotten that in December, the Trump administration has given its approval to a $686 million package for the technology and modernization of Pakistan's F-16 fleet. In essence this was a renewal of a maintenance agreement that had been signed under Joe Biden in 2022. Materially, the timing was a message as it was within seven months of the Pakistani F-16s and Chinese-made J-10s engaging with the Indian Air Force in Operation Sindoor. The same Trump White House which has been pressuring India for purchasing American weapons has been writing cheques for keeping Pakistani jets flying. It's not hard to spot the imbalance at a glance if you're not a geopolitics major.

Add to that the trade agreement signed by Washington in July 2025 with Islamabad, the rhetoric on deepening counterterrorism efforts and the joint work on critical minerals in Pakistan, and only a lot of Rubio sightseeing can make it go away. This is because under a transactional President to his core, the American strategic establishment is hedging. It would like India to be present at the Quad's meeting on Tuesdays and Pakistan on Thursdays. At the root of the entire visit lies this question is New Delhi willing to be one track of a policy with two tracks that the US is implementing in South Asia?

All is for a quad day, and a China subtext.

The highlight of the trip on the calendar was a meeting at Hyderabad House at the Quad foreign ministers' meeting on Tuesday morning, where Rubio sat with Jaishankar, Australian Penny Wong and Japanese Toshimitsu Motegi. But the grouping's sole purpose is to “hold Beijing accountable” in the Indo-Pacific. But Rubio came to Delhi a week after he sat next to Trump in Beijing for a summit that has been called unusually warm by the American media. The Quad was swiftly dubbed by the Chinese as an effort at containment. For their part, India has been quietly relaxing direct flights with China for the last nine months and is considering a visa overhaul. The concept of strategic autonomy, which South Block has been drumming for 20 years, is back in vogue and for a good reason.

Which leads us to the true test in coming months. A deal on trade will probably be inked. Thus the Modi visit to Washington, which was invited for again over the weekend, will most likely take place. More hugs will be captured by the cameras. None of that addresses the fundamental problem: under Trump, America has stopped considering India a strategic partner, a partner with a unique role, and has begun thinking of it as one customer among many in a competitive market useful to balance when China requires balancing, dispensable if Pakistan flatter the narrative, taxable if domestic politics require a foreign villain. The relationship is not over. However, it has been taken off the top shelf and no one in Delhi is deluding themselves otherwise.

Rubio's plane has taken off. The flowers are drooping. But rebuilding the partnership, which for the past decade seemed inevitable, is the more difficult, slower process, and as the second Trump year unfolds, it is clear that, like so much else, it is a process that is negotiable.