
Washington bets big on Riyadh's atom, and the safeguards get left at the door
22 Jul 2026
Created by
The BV Team
The White House is soon making a major nuclear determination that will have a profound impact on Congress, and on conditions that are very different from those of the last 20 years in American nonproliferation history. The administration will propose within days in laws a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that is different from all other accords Washington has made in the Gulf, according to two people familiar with the situation, because it does not prohibit Saudi Arabia from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent fuel in its home country. The documents may be on Capitol Hill as soon as this week, according to one source, and possibly a week or so away from another. A third, who didn't wish to confirm if the safeguard language was missing, merely stated it will be coming soon.
The document is part of a formal agreement known as a Section 123 Agreement, which is referenced in the 1954 Atomic Energy Act and outlines the United States' responsibilities with regard to nuclear technology transfers with foreign partners. It will be signed by Energy Secretary Chris Wright and Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, both of whom signed a first draft in Riyadh last year. Wright has said that the basic structure never came in contact with enrichment and that it has implemented all the nonproliferation requirements in the Atomic Energy Act, which he has described as “some of the most stringent in the world.” Still, those close to the writing envision a narrower and more flexible path: a legal avenue for cooperation in the entire nuclear fuel cycle, from enrichment forward, without imposing on Washington an obligation to transfer enrichment technology outright, but one that isn't precluded either. The Wall Street Journal and the Associated Press report that the construction of the facility would permit American companies to set up an enrichment plant within the kingdom if a feasibility study by the United States and Saudi Arabia is approved, but with inspections more limited than has been received before.
This is the heart of the battle that is all but brewing. An unconditional ban on enrichment and reprocessing is the "gold standard," and the word goes back to the 2009 agreement with the UAE, under which Abu Dhabi pledged to forgo the domestic production of fuel in exchange for American technology for building reactors. Riyadh has never been willing to make that trade. Prince Abdulaziz has made it public that the kingdom plans to enrich uranium and sell the product, and one of those involved in the negotiations said a fallback was being discussed a “black-box” deal where only U.S. personnel would have access to any uranium enrichment facility built on Saudi soil, and both governments would claim their conditions were fulfilled.
Congress does get a say, but not an easy one. The agreement becomes binding once it is formally submitted to the lawmakers who have about 90 days of continuous session to object before it comes into force. Prevention will not be so easy as it would be in a joint resolution of both chambers to pass a disapproval and a two-thirds majority to override a presidential veto which hasn't succeeded in preventing a 123 agreement in the past. But congressional documents examined by Arms Control Association chief Kelsey Davenport have cast genuine questions on the administration's full consideration of the precedent it establishes not only for Saudi Arabia but for the estimated twenty or so other nuclear cooperation agreements the White House is said to be working on globally.
Politically, it is hardly coincidental. This deal comes without the condition the Biden administration has demanded for years Saudi Arabia's civil nuclear program be linked to normalizing ties with Israel. That connection fell apart following October 7, 2023, and Trump has now officially broken that connection, rather than attempt to revive it. For Riyadh, this takes away a political cost that was the biggest associated with the technology. For Jerusalem, it takes one of the last remaining diplomatic carrots.
Israeli officials aren't concealing their nervousness. Israel is determined to fight the pact, with two former defense ministers warning it could usher in a nuclear arms race that has no checks and balances.Israel is set to act vigorously against the pact, with two former defense ministers saying it could trigger an unchecked nuclear arms race in the region. The terms are very dangerous, and show Israel's leverage in Washington on an issue so key to its security is minimal, said former senior diplomat Jeremy Issacharoff. Perhaps a compromise, like that of Russia at Iran's Bushehr plant where fuel rods are bought from abroad and then returned to their country, has been suggested by Israeli national security adviser Tzachi Hanegbi's office. It is unknown if Washington or Riyadh is interested in that compromise.
It's an even more competitive backdrop due to the regional context. Saudi Arabia and nuclear-armed Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact in the wake of Israel's strike on Hamas targets in Qatar, and the Pakistan Defense Minister stated that the kingdom's nuclear capability would be "made available" to it if it was needed, which was widely interpreted in Israel as a warning. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has long stated that he will follow Iran's lead in stockpiling uranium enriched enough for a bomb if the latter decides to do the same, and Iran still has enriched uranium to make a bomb despite months of American and Israeli strikes this year.
Politics has a real monetary back. Then Riyadh has been spending over a hundred billion dollars to develop an estimated twenty gigawatts of nuclear capacity by the early 2030s and a total of sixty gigawatts of new renewable and nuclear generation that will free up crude oil now used for domestic power generation to be exported. For years, American, French, Korean and Chinese vendors have been circling the contract, and Westinghouse has been lobbying sturdily for a part. But the administration's own case for haste is that it lost that business to Seoul or Paris or Beijing and though that's a reason to be fast, it's not to abandon the protections Washington had once insisted on.








