The biggest weapon Washington has in its arsenal is no longer a missile, but a voice, at least six months after American and Israeli fighter jets began the offensive against Iran. This is a spreadsheet. This week Vice President JD Vance has declared that economic pressure is the "most effective tool" the U.S. has at the Iranians' disposal, while at the same time acknowledging that it is a "delicate dance," and maintaining that Tehran feels more pain than the United States does. Now, Treasury officials are promising what they say is the toughest sanctions regime ever assembled against one country – just about when a 60-day negotiating window for the Strait of Hormuz that had opened quietly behind the scenes to no deal expired. The war's own evolution is clear: a conflict that started with the rhetoric of "Military Terror, Strength, and Power not seen since World War II" has become more sedate and lethargic a battle waged with ledgers instead of laser-guided munitions.

This doesn't mean that the guns have stopped firing. Even the leaders of Iran's highest body don't look like they did in February. Iran's president, who was a reformist physician, has been co-led by a new, unseen supreme leader, who was named when his father was assassinated in an earlier Israeli attack on a Tehran bunker this year. In that succession, which was never in doubt, never clearly defined, it is still unclear to outside observers who is really in charge of Iranian policy. In the meantime, the parliamentary speaker, who also serves as Tehran's chief negotiator, has been warning publicly that, regardless of how much military power the United States or any other country builds, the world will lose out on Iran if its people aren't able to find jobs, food or a functioning currency.

Economic data supports both sides' worry. The price of crude oil, which surged above $120 per barrel when the Strait first closed in March, has been hovering in the mid to high $80s in recent days--about 15-20 percent higher than pre-war levels. Close to a fifth of all seaborne crude oil and nearly as much liquefied natural gas is passing through Hormuz, which is operating at just about 25 percent of pre-conflict levels (a few ships a day instead of more than a hundred). The price of gasoline for Americans is up by almost a dollar a gallon from a year ago. That's a slow economic bleed at home, and it's more of a political liability for the White House after it promised a swift and total victory in the war.

The seascape has become more perilous than ever. Houthi forces in Yemen, which suspended attacks in the Red Sea after the Gaza ceasefire in October, have resumed their operations on Iran's side of the Red sea, and this month they have admitted their first death in the war on a merchant ship off the Yemeni coast at the Bab el-Mandeb strait. A missile strike on a container ship near Pakistan's coast, as well as accusations against Iran firing into Emirati territory, that have been denied by Tehran as a possible “false-flag” maneuver, show how far this conflict could go without either side decided to escalate.

So, the redrawing of the region's power map is taking place in that context. Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan inked a mutual defence agreement in Mecca this month, pledging to defend each other if one was attacked. Officials say the accord is defensive and open to other states, and that they have no intention of targeting any one foe, but few doubt it was written with Israel's growing regional reach and Washington's less-than-consistent support for the Gulf states' security firmly in mind. It comes at a time that is a few weeks after Israel announced a “Hexagon” alliance with Greece, Cyprus, India and partners of the Abraham Accords, and builds on an earlier Saudi-Pakistan agreement reached after Israel's unprecedented attack on Qatar last September. Remarkably, Pakistan has effectively used its trusted position with Tehran to gain a lot of space to move messages between the Gulf capitals and Tehran, while the more ‘friends’ of Washington and Jerusalem, India, has, on paper, less influence over the outcome of the crisis.

Asia's other festering dispute has been swept into the tide too. Donald Trump has called for a new summit meeting with Kim Jong Un and he has ordered a reduction in joint military exercises with South Korea, which he said Pyongyang was “unthreatening and respectful” to, a characterization Pyongyang has yet to eagerly endorse, launching short-range missiles and brushing aside Seoul's objections as double dealing. The optics are important because North Korea has been known to have boosted its technical ties with Iran in this conflict; drone and missile technology is being shared in two directions, like Russia. Washington's pragmatic tactic of trying to woo Pyongyang while squeezing Tehran economically seems to be more of an improvisation on the fly rather than a coherent strategy, to many regional strategists.

That comes out as just one crisis, but one that serves as an indicator whether American power continues to dictate the terms in an area growing more bold in setting its own rules. Sanctions can cause pain Iran's own authorities acknowledge this but not yet enough pain to bring about surrender, and, more, have sparked a countervailing trend of trilateral agreements, hedged alliances and diplomatic free-for-all that will endure beyond this war. Half a year later, the issue is no longer if Washington can bomb Tehran into submission. The question is whether Washington can even write the region's future.