The rhetoric coming out of the United Nations might have been a familiar form of diplomatic theatre. The trends behind them were not as mundane. Washington is doing critical thinking on its pressure on Iran. Beijing is calculating the price of its stand-off with the U.S. Gulf countries safeguard export routes. India is looking to ensure energy security, and to develop trade connections that will provide it with greater leverage. All these capitals are figuring it out, but there's one question on everyone's mind- how can goods, fuel and money continue to flow when a political argument turns physical?

The question is at its heart Iran. President Donald Trump has given Tehran a new warning about activity at a fortified tunnel complex near Natanz, known as Pickaxe Mountain. The depth of the location makes the military decision difficult – it would be serious but not necessarily a resolution to what is going beneath the ground. The plant is also a bargaining chip for Iran. There is also a political and security price to be paid for Washington to permit suspected nuclear work to go ahead. Both threats thus impact negotiations before the weapon is shot.

Oil traders are impatient while diplomats wait for the identification of which threat is a negotiating ploy. They calculate the risk of production delay, ships damaged, increased insurance costs and slow loading of cargo. The disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz during this year have seen unusual swings in the price of Brent.The price of Brent has had unusually large movements during this year's disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, according to the US Energy Information Administration. Its energy security data also reveal the significance of the waterway goes beyond the Gulf; even if the flow is disrupted, it could upset an energy system that already is used to transporting vast quantities of energy through a single waterway.

But the expenses don't stop at the gas pump. High crude prices lead to high refinery costs, costs of transport and costs of petrochemicals. A delayed shipment in transit may lose a factory production window, a more costly trip can reduce an exporter's profit before a product even arrives to a buyer. The International Monetary Fund projects that a sustained increase in oil prices of 10 per cent will increase global inflation by around 0.4 percentage point and lower global output by 0.1 to 0.2 per cent. Those are rough calculations but they reflect the economic cost of an undecided war.

China has a sort of embarrassing version of that problem. It is a great industrial power and a big importer of oil. EIA estimates that China consumed a record 11.6 million b/d of crude in 2025, but that imports fell in the second quarter of 2026 due to increasing prices and disturbances in the Gulf. Beijing has the option of using inventories to take up some of the pressure and having alternative suppliers. It cannot render a lengthy sea disturbance an unimportant event to its factories or costs of freight or to its consumers. That provides both Washington and Beijing with a motive to play hardball, but to maintain a modicum of business continuity.

For India, it is the first time foreign policy turns into a game of economic protection. New Delhi is interested in cheap energy, safe transport and access to export markets. It also must have the ability to deal with the United States, and its Gulf partners and Europe without letting any one deal affect all other decisions. The under-construction India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is part of that. Its potential is in other transportation or commercial links, as long as governments are able to fund the links, construct them and maintain the surrounding area safe. A corridor at a summit is an aspiration, a corridor available for businesses to access on a known cost becomes strategic capacity.

That should dictate India's reactions to the broader diplomatic din. Raising Kashmir again at the UN will make headlines in New Delhi as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is expected to do so again. Politically the answer should be given positively, then India should stick to its bigger agenda. India's stake in maritime security, access to energy contracts, investments in manufacturing, and trade will continue to impact India long after this General Assembly. The same principle should apply to claims of exclusion from specific conversations in New York by Pakistan. If it is determined that the meeting has been missed, that is one indicator. It is not a substitute for assessing the content of American policy and the agreements that ensue.

Nation's viewpoints differ on Washington's Iran policy. The other believes that the pressure from the military can make a nuclear settlement possible. The other is that threats will make compromise more difficult for Tehran to accept and they will make it more likely that an incident at sea leads to a broader response. Both sides should be examined in light of the events, particularly safety of the commercial vessels and the conditions of any agreement that can be proven. “Imminent strike” or “secret deal” or “last-minute and irreversible diplomacy” should be regarded as an allegation until proven.

Who benefits in the short term from uncertainty is less easy to determine. Oil exporters could make more money per barrel, but suffer threats and attacks or infrastructure damage. Alternative supply offers US producers some good news but US households are still paying more for fuel. Importers can spread the risk of their purchases, but new contracts, new tankers, and new routes will cost them. Investors have the ability to move capital around rapidly, while manufacturers and governments typically don't have the ability to rebuild a supply chain as rapidly.