Today, almost five months after the war started on February 28, the Middle East is not at war. It's playing five simultaneously and Washington's efforts to negotiate all five in one big package are beginning to crack.

Begin with the number that affects markets. Prior to the war, Brent crude oil was trading in the high 70s, but it was pushed above $120 per barrel on March 4 by Iran's announcement of a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and climbed further this past week as the two countries resumed their skirmishes for control of the waterway. Brent crude was up more than 4 percent in a single session as Washington and Tehran wrangled over the vital passage. The strait is used by almost 20 percent of the world's oil transported by sea and the International Energy Agency has already declared it the greatest supply disruption in the history of the world's oil market. As soon as the chokepoint remains closed, more for a longer time, "inflation and growth" figures in Europe would enter genuine pain territory, industry analysts have warned, to the tune of $150-200. For the first time Qatar has declared force majeure on gas exports due to missile damage to its liquefied natural gas terminal, and it is expected that repairs will take years, not months. It's no longer an abstract geopolitical tale. It's popping up on Peshawar to LA gas pumps.

There's Jordan, however, a nation that never sought to be a warren, but in which the American forces have left a bloody trail. On July 17, Iranian ballistic missiles and drones struck a base in Jordan, killing two US servicememen and sending four to the hospital, while a third remains missing. Amman's foreign minister has been clear about the consequences of any Israeli retaliation, and cautioned for months that it would not only bring war to the region, no one wanted, but also to the Middle East. Much of the material it received was caught by Jordan, and with the support of American, British and French air defense, but the kingdom's patience is clearly waning. It is expected to take on the burden of a war it did not initiate and the "payback" rhetoric circulating is a matter of who will ultimately pay a price for a war that a nation played a very small role in.

Bushehr poses a slightly different kind of threat. Since the war began, there have been four separate attacks near Iran's only working nuclear power plant, with the latest being a projectile made by Tehran that apparently didn't hit the reactor core. IAEA chief Rafael Grossi said that a direct attack on an operating reactor such as Bushehr is "the red line in the red line of nuclear safety" and said the risk of radioactive dispersion is very high if the core itself is attacked. None of the regional governments, from Riyadh to Doha, has not realized how devastating an accident at the plant would be on the region's water, air and food supply, but the strikes around the plant continue to take place, four times and each time dismissed after the fact as a "near miss".

On the legal and diplomatic side, the arrest warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu has returned to the spotlight, with New York's Mayor calling on Washington to implement the International Criminal Court's warrant on the Israeli PM as he is expected in Manhattan for the UN General Assembly in September. Netanyahu is the mastermind of a terrible campaign against the Palestinian people," said Mamdani, who said that every legal option has been explored, but the city cannot do it itself. Israel's UN ambassador brushed aside the remarks. But no matter how one views the deal, it reveals much about the uncomfortable fact that a sitting head-of-government whose arrest warrant has been issued by an international court can plan a state visit to the country that hosts the most influential champion of that same court.Regardless of one's opinion of the exchange, it reveals much about the uncomfortable reality that a sitting head-of-government who has been sought by an international court can plan a state visit to the country that hosts that same court's most powerful champion, and nobody expects anything to happen. It is that double standard which critics from the Global South continue to cite as a case in point whenever Western capitals address issues of accountability.

Meanwhile, Turkey has taken a neutral stance on the war and put it on the forefront of the region without participating. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said many times that Israel's actions in Gaza, Lebanon and now in Iran are a threat to regional stability, warning that the conflict is reaching a “critical” moment, and plans to increase the production of missiles. In a lengthy interview, Iran's foreign minister has since asserted that Ankara was secretly involved in an attempt to induce a Kurdish uprising in Iranian territory early in the war and that Trump was later told by Erdogan that his government had been encouraged to withhold from a conflict in which it was said to have been tempted to play the latter part of the war. The account, whether true or embellished with Iranian nationalism, shows the extent to which the war has shaken existing alliances to their core.

The surprise beneficiary, Pakistan, is now holding the strings of the threads. Field Marshal Asim Munir has made a number of visits to Tehran, including bringing Iran's interior minister to army headquarters this week, and Islamabad's diplomatic muscle has played a role in giving at least one ceasefire window after Trump took the credit for the pause directly to Munir and Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif. That a South Asian army chief, who had been promoted to field marshal last year after his confrontation with India, is now the Middle East's broker for a war in the region reflects how light America's belief in Tehran is.

The whole picture is not of the mission closing in on completion, but of a war economy tightening up: Oil markets on a hair trigger, a Gulf ally bleeding out American soldiers, a nuclear plant hanging by a thread, a wanted leader preparing to ride to victory and outside powers proxying for the United States in a mediation job it can't do. Any real solution will require less drama and more candor on who really has to pay for this war, and it will come from no more ultimatums that are posted online.