Three seemingly unrelated narratives and now all in one awkward photo for New Delhi. Washington has just announced a harsh new pricing escalator on generic drugs, while the Gulf's shipping lanes have once again come under fire after a new series of attacks on shipping vessels near the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran has formally declared that any attack on its land will be met with "equal missiles. There was no single cause for all this and all of it comes to India at the least opportune time, as the calendar ticks on while a trade truce is about to expire with the United States.

Begin with the pharmaceutical shock the numbers are staggering even by the standards of this trade war. This week, Donald Trump announced that importation of generic drugs to the US will be duty-free for two years beginning Aug. 1, then a 100 per cent tariff for one year and 200 per cent for the following year. The aim is to bring back drugs on American soil and companies that refuse to erect plants on American soil during the given timeframe will effectively be shut out of the world's largest drug market. This is a reason for concern for India more than for anyone else as India has exported nearly 9.7 billion dollars worth of generics to the US last year, making it the number one supplier of cheap medicines to American pharmacies. Two years' grace is generous until you realize building and certifying a US manufacturing plant usually doesn't take place within 24 months, and the industry has been cash negative on moving capacity due to the Section 232 pharmaceutical investigation that was launched last year.

Add to that the broader tariff saga that has been enveloping the bilateral relationship since April. The agreement, a temporary one of 10 per cent, between the two countries comes into its end today and negotiators from both sides have been saying the first phase of a bilateral trade agreement is "parked at the last one per cent of legal text" for the past two weeks. For its part, that one per cent is proving to be very stubborn and for a reason: India wants the rate to be much lower than what Vietnam, Bangladesh and, most telling, Pakistan pay. Meanwhile, Islamabad walked away from its own tariff negotiations months ago with a reported rate of about 10 per cent, which included promises of mineral concessions and oil reserves partnership that bolstered Washington's energy aspirations, while India's reciprocal rate has fluctuated from 10, 18 to 25 per cent, depending on the week. Trade advisers in Washington tell about the reason this irks Delhi so much No Indian government can sign onto a deal that permanently puts its exporters at a disadvantage compared to a strategic competitor who took the credit of a ceasefire India never signed-on to during the past year.

The oil issue only adds to the squeeze. A bipartisan sanctions bill, which was first introduced by the late Senator Lindsey Graham and has gained the Trump administration's support, includes sanctions of up to 100 per cent on the top buyers of Russian crude, a list that includes India and the other major buyers as well as conveniently exempts Japan, France, Hungary, and Belgium. But it's not lost on Indian refiners. Russia has delivered about half of India's crude imports until June and is expected to deliver nearly 2.6 to 2.7 million b/d in July, which has become even more critical since the Strait of Hormuz became a theatre for war. No other supplier can deliver that volume at the same price or reliability in time for Washington's demands, and refiners who have years of expertise in calibrating their equipment for Russian crude grades can't change everything eight thousand miles away on a deadline established by legislation.

As for the Gulf, the temperature has gone up again. More than a dozen vessels have been damaged since the crisis began in February and two are believed to have been hit with projectiles this week as they were making their way through the strait under a dark tracking system one a Saudi flagged vessel and the other a Qatari LNG tanker. In response to the U.S. threats of attacking Iran's bridges and power plants, the Iranian foreign minister said that its defence doctrine was: “Eye for an eye” and those who help such an attack will be considered a legitimate target. Traffic at the Hormuz port, which transports 50% of global seaborne oil, is still at one-fifth of pre-crisis levels and any new strike will force insurers to increase premiums which will ultimately be reflected in the cost of Indian petrol.

Collectively, they painted a picture of an America asking a nation to take contradictory pressure at the same time: cut off from the Russian oil supply, but also at the same time facing a punishment on drugs importation; accept a lower price for oil than its neighbour who gave Washington mineral deposits and a counterterrorism triumph in return for goodwill. Patience has its limits, and so far India has avoided a public showdown, opting instead for a more discreet approach via diplomacy than sparring on Twitter. What is emerging in Delhi is that friendship with Washington, however coyly it is channeled through summit photo ops, is an ever-expanding cost, while strategic autonomy, no matter how politically incorrect it may sound in Washington, is beginning to seem the only type of insurance India has.