The strength of a defence agreement is greatest on the day it is signed. But when one party is threatened, and the other party has to determine whether to help what help.Its true value is when a party is under threat and the others have to determine whether they will offer help, and if so, what. It's where the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement, between Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan, now sits, signed in August.

The assertion that Turkey has given up on Pakistan is still to be substantiated. The military chiefs of the three countries met in Riyadh for four days just four days ago to discuss intelligence sharing and military coordination and how the forces might cooperate. However, it is expected that Turkish parliamentary approval will be taken into consideration once Parliament reconvenes in October.

These are indications that an alliance is being built up and not broken up. But the gatherings also reveal a challenging issue: will three governments with mutually threatening neighbours be able to agree on a common response if a crisis should arise and a mutual defence pact is called for?

Saudi Arabia's worry is the security of its cities, oil installations and export lanes in the growing Iran war, which is spreading across the Gulf and into Yemen. It has its own border dispute with Afghanistan and home-grown militancy in Pakistan. Turkey is interested in influencing the Middle East and South Asian countries, but also has interests and connections outside the three-country deal. Their interests do not always line up, their priorities do not always align.

The Afghanistan issue illustrates the importance of this. Afghan authorities have blamed Pakistan for allowing the Islamic State fighters to pass through the border, claiming that they killed 28 of them and took 32 prisoners in Nuristan. Pakistan refutes this claim and has called for proof. There is no proof either side has shared intelligence with the other on Islamabad or that Ankara has altered its defence commitment with Kabul. So-called claims of “betrayal” by the Turks must be substantiated by evidence of a concrete Turkish operation. It does not report the incident at the border so far.

It's an important distinction because the first practical test of the pact could be in Yemen, not Afghanistan. The three military chiefs denounced Houthis' attacks against Makkah and Saudi civilian and economic infrastructure. An attack is one thing; supplying surveillance or air-defence or going into combat is something else. The public pledge is that an attempt to attack one of them is an attack on all three. It doesn't, on the information that is publicly available, tell businesses or citizens what each government would do next.

The Saudi capital will evaluate the pact based on its impact on the protection of assets which sustain the Saudi economy. The stakes are high, as is shown in the case of the East–West Pipeline. It halted operations on September 11 after being targeted by drones, which disrupted crude oil shipments via the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Loading has returned, and current pipeline throughput is estimated to be about 2.65 million bpd, though it could be 3-4 million. A complete recovery to its previous level could be gradual. An abstract military concern for an oil exporter is revenue and customer confidence.

The impact of the commercial effects is far from Saudi Arabia. Prior to the war, about 25% of the world's oil needs transited through the Strait of Hormuz. Exports of Middle Eastern crude have bounced back via alternate routes and more convoluted shipping arrangements, but not necessarily in volume. Brent was trading around $105 a barrel and US crude was around $92 on Tuesday. Those rates influence the prices of refineries, freight, inflation and import bills of nations like India and Pakistan. An expensive diversion of a tanker that arrives at its buyer will bring back oil, but not the certainty that rested on such contracts and investment plans.

Thus, Pakistan has two reasons to cherish the pact, and two reasons to be on guard. Saudi security cooperation can be a good boost to Islamabad's regional stature and its economic ties with Riyadh. The cooperation of the Turkish defence industry and military could be useful in practice. Meanwhile, Pakistan is also on the spending spree for its own security forces, for the maintenance of the Afghan border and for the rising energy costs. A commitment that attracts it into a regional battle has a much greater price tag than training, intelligence or equipment.

Turkey has a calculation to make. Ankara can provide the capacities of the defence industry and diplomatic diplomacy without taking on a commitment of a magnitude that has not yet been proven. Its speaker in parliament has even talked of extending the deal to other Muslim nations, including Iran, but expressed that the agreement is not targeting any specific nation. The role could provide Turkey with space to speak to both sides. It also asks Riyadh and Islamabad a fair question: Given an attack, will Ankara have the room to manoeuvre to allow partners to act, or will it delay a decision?

India must focus on the capabilities, rather than the slogans, coming out of the pact. Intelligence sharing, joint procurement or integrated air defence or agreed deployment procedures would alter the security landscape. A communique is of limited effect. But in addition, New Delhi has significant economic stakes in the stability of the Gulf: whether the three partners characterise their partnership as a coalition or alliance, costly oil and disrupted shipping would impact on Indian business and households.

The Mecca pact, however, hasn't visibly fractured and nor has Turkey visibly walked away from Pakistan. The harder problem is just waiting, it's in the open. Saudi Arabia requires a tangible guarantee of protection for its territory and export and Pakistan needs assistance without a new heavy burden of military commitment; and Turkey desires influence without compromising diplomatic maneuverability. The next step of the agreement will be a concrete decision regarding resources, command and risk. For now, both ‘unbreakable alliance’ and ‘Turkish betrayal' carry more weight than the facts.