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Doval’s Vietnam Visit Puts China, BrahMos and $25 Billion Trade Ambition at Centre of India’s Indo-Pacific Strategy

2 Nov 2026

Created by

The BV Team

The meeting between national security adviser Ajit Doval and Defence Minister General Phan Van Giang in Hanoi on November 2 does not mark yet another iteration of bilateral defence dialogue but a step towards shaping a new path for the cooperation between the two countries. It symbolizes India's aspiration to have a stronger strategic foothold in its Southeast Asian neighbor, increase its market of defence exports and forge ties with pressure-tested nations in the South China Sea.


The timing is important. China remains the dominant force in the regional military landscape, Vietnam continues to upgrade its military forces, and India is looking to play a bigger role in the Indo Pacific in an increasingly modernised military without the formal ties of military alliances. Hanoi has something even more useful to give New Delhi a partner who is strategically independent, and has first-hand experience in dealing with pressure from China.


During the discussions Doval touched on the current state of defence cooperation and prospects for enhanced cooperation between the two countries under the India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030. The visit comes in the wake of the elevation of bilateral relations to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the visit of the Vietnamese President To Lam to India in May 2026. The two governments have also set an ambitious target of bilateral trade for 2030 of USD 25 billion per year.


The big driver of the engagement is the increasing linkage between defence cooperation, economic security, military technology and maritime intelligence. India and Vietnam have a growing interest in expanding bilateral strategic cooperation beyond just diplomatic interactions.


Vietnam's geographical location is one of the most significant in Southeast Asia. It has a coastline of some 3,260 kilometres which borders on the waterways where international shipping, energy transport and regional military rivalry are concentrated. By some common standards, it is estimated that the South China Sea accounts for one-third of all world shipping by sea, though this figure varies, depending on whether the measurement is by volume or value.


Friction between China and Vietnam has been ongoing due to China's large territorial claims and its military presence on disputed territories and maritime enforcement. Hanoi has thus embarked on a diversified defence policy, maintaining ties with Russia and bolstering cooperation with India, Japan, the United States and other countries.


India's plan is different from Washington's plan. New Delhi would not need Vietnam to be part of an anti-China military bloc. Instead, it provides military training, equipment, technology, maritime cooperation and diplomatic support, all while honoring Hanoi's policy of strategic autonomy.


This is important because Vietnam continues to adhere to its anti-alliance and anti-MFA policies. A strategy for India must thus involve building up the capacities of the Vietnamese without requiring their political commitment.


One of the most commercially and strategically intriguing options is the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile. BrahMos is being developed with Indian-Russian collaboration, and has already set an export milestone with India's deal to the Philippines for some $375 million worth of BrahMos in 2022.


Vietnam has been previously linked to BrahMos discussions but no official purchase or delivery of BrahMos was confirmed from the Nov 2 meeting. It would be premature to consider a potential deal as a done deal.


However, this is a military necessity. An anti-ship missile battery at the coast may significantly increase the difficulty of the hostile attacking navy to engage in their operations, especially if assisted by surveillance aircraft, coastal radar and accurate target data.


The appeal of the missiles to Vietnam is not just in terms of range or speed. It's the capacity to increase the cost of maritime coercion. For Vietnam, it would establish a new presence in India, where the military was historically reliant on Russian, American and European military technology.


It is not just missiles that offer the commercial opportunity. Vietnam has a significant number of Soviet and Russian equipment in operation, resulting in a potential need for maintenance, upgrades, spares, electronics, naval systems and life cycle support. The Indian defence manufacturers might be competitive for specific modernisation contracts, but there are a number of considerations, including compatibility, Russian intellectual property restrictions and financing.


The economic aspect should be given equivalent consideration. In FY25–26, the value of India-Vietnam merchandise trade is estimated to be nearly $16.4 billion, with nearly $6.1 billion of exports from India and $10.3 billion from Vietnam. This is a loss of about $4.2 billion for New Delhi.


If we are to reach $25 billion by 2030, the increase will be approximately 52% from the baseline, or about 11% compounded annually over four years.


India has opportunities in its pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, chemicals, information technology, industrial components and diversification in the electronics and manufacturing and export-processing sector in Vietnam.


Defence-Industrial cooperation can strengthen these commercial links by joint production, engineering and technology partnerships. However, it will require commercially viable agreements more so than diplomacy, to achieve this.


Another strategic opportunity is the ability of maritime domain awareness. India already has a track record in the monitoring of the coast line, naval training and, sharing information across the Indian Ocean. The two countries' cooperation could be expanded to facilitate understanding of maritime activities along both approaches to the South China Sea.


This may include vessel tracking, maritime communications, cyber security and exchanges of unclassified operational information. It is not a blanket indication of a new intelligence-sharing pact, as there was no public announcement of a new intelligence-sharing pact after Doval's meeting.


Beyond the geopolitical is a considerable amount of significance. A more capable Vietnam, for its part, could play a part in regional deterrence, while India's security links could be extended to the east without it establishing permanent military bases.


Naturally, China will review these developments in the context of its overall strategy with India. However, Hanoi's ties with Beijing are more complex than just oppositional. China continues to be a vital economic partner for Vietnam and there is ample reason for both governments to avoid turning their dispute into an open military confrontation.


For Washington, better defence cooperation between the two nations and with other partners in the region could help them maintain freedom of navigation without any direct American presence in every regional security arrangement. Russia, on the other hand, risks losing more market share in a sector in which it had long held a certain sway.

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