A failure of electricity, a port terminal with faulty equipment, or a broken communication cable can have the same effect as a military threat severely disrupt daily life before governments can determine who is to blame. It's the issue that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte was addressing on Thursday, when he said the alliance is prepared for Russia's hybrid warfare, which includes cyberattacks. His assurance matters. The question that is more important is whether Europe can maintain the services it needs in the event of an attack that might be carried out over days or weeks by its author.

NATO has "response options" that are not always known, and that do not necessarily mirror an attack, said Rutte. He also called for more assistance from allies to Ukraine following hybrid incidents and said that Moscow should not be rewarded for destabilising countries on its side. This is a deterrent message, and it reveals a tricky calculation. A response has to place a cost on the incident but not escalate it to a larger conflict. Russia denies that it is making hybrid attacks in Europe. Between accusation and proof, between speed and credibility, military strength is worth as much as anything.

At the same time, the defence intelligence service of Denmark, in an assessment, provided Rutte's comments with greater context. It anticipates that Russia will be stepping up hybrid operations against NATO and the West in the coming weeks and months. It considers the likelihood of a small-scale war waged by a limited force against a NATO state to be low but increasing and a large-scale attack by a full force invasion to be improbable. Those differences should be noted. An assessment of growing danger is not a prediction of imminent war. It's an alert that is being raised that it may be more frequent and more difficult to contain in smaller operations.

The targets are well known to any company relying on reliable electricity, transport and data. An industrial transformer, a railway loading freight, a port with fuel or an undersea cable with communications could all be a strategic pressure point. Before governments answer the question of attribution, damage can spread far and wide via supply contracts and insurance policies. A factory can lose a shift, a ship can wait at anchor, a logistics operator can re-rout cargo. The economic loss may be greater than the damage.

That is why the Baltic region is investing in infrastructure initially designed to be used mainly during bad weather conditions and equipment failure. Lithuania is building its much-anticipated Gizai power substation, which is close to the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, with anti-explosive drone and other deliberate security features. The extra security costs are estimated to be €48million or more. Figure represents the cost of one project and not the cost of the entire grid. It does, however, illustrate how the threat of sabotage is already impacting capital budgets.

The same computation is carried out below sea level. Cables are the lifeline of communications and can only be repaired by specially engineered vessels, access and time. The European Commission has allocated an extra €347 million for digital backbone projects in 2026 and 2027, including more robust subsea cables and repair capabilities. This investment should be seen as an economic safeguard. Many political shocks can be absorbed by the company, but payments, shipping information and communications are more difficult to price in terms of length of time of uncertainty.

The amount NATO commits to spending illustrates the extent of the problem. Allies have signed up to increase defence and security spending to 5% of GDP by 2035, with as much as 1.5% of GDP allocated for other functions like protecting infrastructure, securing networks and civil preparedness. Those percentages are goals, not a show of how many vulnerabilities were patched. A private port operator, a national power operator and associated security services must be able to warn and respond promptly together, but this is harder to achieve than buying equipment.

Europe must pay this bill and households and governments are already being burdened by high energy costs. A failure in the electricity supply or fuel terminal would thus result in an economy with low lubrication towards yet another price shock. Initial market response to an incident can occur prior to investigators reaching a decision: insurers now look at exposure, operators explore alternate delivery avenues, and customers ask, "Will deliveries be made? Physical damage is not the only thing that has to be prevented in a successful defence; that uncertainty must be limited as well.

In addition, there is a political market for uncertainty. The possibility of attack can result in varying reports, rumors and pressures for immediate counter-attack. While waiting for evidence, NATO may weaken the case for each incident to be considered as part of a coordinated Russian operation. Allies who wait too long mean that they open themselves for more testing. Denials don't end an investigation and suspicion does not end an investigation. Clear attribution, shared intelligence and effective selection of consequences is key to maintaining a unified allied response.

While NATO countries are looking at the security of the continent, other nations, such as India, are thinking about European security. Indian shippers and receivers depend on reliable shipping modes, payment structures, and energy costs. Even if an Indian asset were not attacked, a long-term disruption at a port in Europe or in its power grid could have an impact on contracts and freight prices. New Delhi has a vested interest in a response that maintains free trade, prevents bullying and allows for diplomacy. It doesn't have to believe a claim on any specific incident without evidence to acknowledge the overall economic risk.