A series of Turkish military transport planes including C-130 Hercules and A400M Atlas jets made multiple landings at Pakistan's Rawalpindi-based Nur Khan airbase and on the outskirts of Karachi at Masroor airbase for nearly three days last week. Defence analysts reviewed flight-tracking data which showed that the activity took place from August 19 to 21 and a third airbase, Murid airbase, was also involved in the pattern. Ankara and Islamabad have not said what material those planes were transporting and it's that mystery that has occupied Indian security agencies since then.

It's not a coincidence. The airlift came within days of the Mecca Joint Defence Agreement signed on August 7 by Pakistan, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in which the three countries pledge mutual defence pledges and all say it is defensive in nature. Considering the context, a sudden surge in heavy lift sorties in some of Pakistan's most strategically placed Air Bases, one just next door to the Army Chief's office in Rawalpindi and the other with sea access over the Arabian Sea, sounds more like a message that was supposed to be heard.

The cargo holds were never identified by any government as containing what. Security sources across various Indian media outlets have indicated that the payload could be drones and associated ground-based equipment, as well as components from the HQ-series air defence systems, believed to be manufactured in the Middle East by Turkey, which has been Pakistan's drone supplier. None of these reports have been substantiated and it is too early to take any speculation as fact. However, the pattern of Pakistan's post-sindoor procurement, creating a layer of Turkish drone technology on top of a Chinese-built missile shield is now so firmly entrenched, even unverified reports have weight in the threat assessments in New Delhi.

That threat assessment is quite memory reliant. Pakistan fired about 400 drones last May during the four-day exchange, many of which were later determined to be Asisguard Songar systems, manufactured by Turkey. The layered air defence that foiled most of those drones did not leave a lasting impression on the minds of those who planned it here; rather, it was a reminder that Ankara's air defence exports to Islamabad were not pious diplomatic statements, but inputs on the battlefield, with an immediate impact on Indian soldiers and civilians. Any new transfer, confirmed or otherwise, will be viewed through that lens and not as a stand-alone commercial transaction between two sovereign states.

Turkey's calculations are its own, and it's better to state it clearly than to moralise and yes, I mean it! For more than a decade, Ankara has fostered Pakistan as a defence market, providing naval vessels, drones and military training, and establishing a trajectory that affords Turkey not only economic benefits but geopolitical status in South Asia by expanding its arms portfolio.For more than a decade, Pakistan has been Ankara's arms market, and it has established a relationship that gives Turkish industry not only economic returns but a geopolitical presence in South Asia through its arms trade. It was fitting that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif to express his solidarity with the Pakistani government within a few days of the attack in Pahalgam last year.It was appropriate that last year, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan publicly voiced his support to Islamabad, including a phone call expressing his solidarity with the Pakistani government within days of the attack at Pahalgam. But to view Turkey simply as a spoiler deity ignores the more displeasurable lesson that Ankara is pursuing its own interests with a straightforwardness that India will not only have to tolerate, but copy.

What India has really been tested with is the economic undercurrent and so far it is measured, not punitive. India has an annual trade surplus of almost $2.7 billion with Turkey with almost $5.2 billion worth of cotton, engineering goods and mineral products exported annually while about $2.8 billion worth of marble, processed foods and machinery are imported. That imbalance is why it has never been possible to implement a straight government-imposed trade embargo, despite the public mood shifting ahead of policy. Last year, the Confederation of All India Traders (CAT), which represents more than 125 trade bodies, protested for a complete boycott, while Myntra and Ajio withdrew Turkish apparel brands from their platforms and the Cotton Association of India (CAI) suspended all trade with Ankara, citing that India exported nearly $2.84 billion worth of goods to Turkey, and cotton accounted for about $74 million of that value. Udaipur's marble industry had approached PM's Office to control Turkish stone imports. In the most tangible state action, the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security cancelled its clearance for Celebi Aviation's ground handling operations in India, an action which was later stayed by the Bombay High Court for further hearings.

What comes out is a geometry of pressure instead of rupture: pressure is applied to India by India in the places where India is willing to give them market access, and where they are willing to give India a good name but pressure is not applied where India is willing to give them market access, and a good name. That's the more sustainable attitude, I suppose. A full economic break would be a major event that would cost Turkey $2.7 billion to achieve a symbolic sense of satisfaction, but would have minimal impact on the decisions made by Turkey's defence sector regarding its exports to Pakistan which are being influenced by Islamabad's cheque book and Ankara's own industrial ambitions, rather than by the Indian consumer.

The Indian counter-drone effort has so far been military, rather than commercial fast-tracking indigenous systems development, beefing up integrated air defence presence along the western border and taking every reported transfer confirmed or suspected as a signal to toughen up. Diplomatically, expect New Delhi to continue to differentiate between Erdogan's rhetoric which lends little practical leverage and from Turkish commercial entities operating on Indian soil where there is real leverage and has been used. The unanswered question will be if that distinction is sustainable when Ankara's defence ties with Islamabad are further solidified, especially in the context of the newly-established trilateral cooperation agreement, which now also involves Riyadh.