The new development is reported by The Wall Street Journal overnight, which says that Abbas Kamel, then head of Egyptian intelligence, called off a call to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu a couple of days before Hamas launched its attack. According to Arab officials the paper quoted, Cairo made two attempts to make it through.

It released a soft-landing statement in June 2023 warning of the instability in Gaza, and urging Israel to return to the negotiating table with Hamas about the hostages and prisoners. Kamel flew in personally in September, and warned the strip could blow up on all of them. Israeli officials assured him that it was in hand. The warning to Netanyahu was issued, and according to one source, Egyptian warnings persisted until about 48 hours before the attack. Netanyahu's office declined to comment. In the preceding months, it has previously denied any contact with Kamel.

Kamel's previous visit was reported just a day before. According to The Atlantic, on September 26, 2023, an aircraft owned by the Egyptian intelligence landed at Ben Gurion and departed after 67 minutes. Sources in seven countries said it was impossible for a spy chief to cross a border for an hour, unless the message was serious, and that no one in Israel's highest echelons would have invited him in without the knowledge of the prime minister.

At the time, national security adviser Tzachi Hanegbi said that the visit did not occur. The New York Times also on Saturday reported on an earlier Haaretz report that the UAE president, Mohammed bin Zayed, had "warned Netanyahu himself" of the potential consequences. The warning was never passed on to the security chiefs, according to five former high-level Israeli officials who spoke with the Times.

Before too much is taken from this, it is necessary to point out the limits. Of the three alleged warnings, there was no mention of a date, target or scale. But Israel will rightly argue that neighbouring countries warn of possible attacks but should be taken with a pinch of salt, and that an intelligence system thrives on rumors. The Egyptians also have their interests. Cairo has been seeking a Gaza deal for years and for good reason, it saw it coming. In October 2024, Kamel was transferred from his post, and is now a presidential adviser, raising the issue of what he has to gain from the story now being told.

But it's the pattern that counts even more than a single call. There were three separate channels – Egyptian, Emirati and, according to some reports, more that were all heading in the same direction. Israel's case is based on one assumption: that Hamas was dissuaded and distracted from ruling. The Egyptians were demanding that Israel abandon this assumption, and apparently no one at the highest level did. The difference between a warning and a normal call is not evidence enough that Netanyahu did not hear a warning. The more serious question is why, when the PM was repeatedly advised that Gaza was in dire straits, did he not convene his defense chiefs.

So far, Netanyahu has been retreating and ducking when it comes to the reporting. He replied with a defiant speech at the UN, threatened to sue Haaretz over the Emirati account and stated his office had checked call logs to see that none were found. However, every new account, and most of all the Journal's, undermines a flat refusal.

He has also rejected a state commission of inquiry. He has instead supported a panel appointed by the government, which, according to the attorney general, is too designed to fail to come up with a credible report. Families grieving the loss of their loved ones have denounced it as a cover-up. His point is that he doesn't trust the Supreme Court President who would appoint a state commission. But critics respond that that is convenient, because they have been making the same accusations against his coalition for years.

The opposition sees a chance. As the first step of any government formed, Gadi Eisenkot, Naftali Bennett, Avigdor Liberman and Yair Golan have pledged to pursue an inquiry into the state. If there is a coalition without Arab parties, it may be 61 seats; the polls and analysis suggest. There is a difference of opinion among its members on many things, but two unifying issues are an inquiry on October 7 and universal conscription. The Oct. 27 election is, in part, a referendum on whether or not the nation receives that inquiry.

The economic stakes are not theoretical. The IMF has found Israel's public debt rose from 60 percent of GDP at the end of 2022 to 68.6 percent at the end of 2025. In 2024, defense spending came to 8.4 percent of GDP compared with 5.2 percent in 2023 and the Finance Ministry estimated war costs at 141.6 billion shekels at the end of the year.

The OECD projected a deficit of 5.3 percent this year, which is supposed to rise to 4.2 percent in 2027, and growth of 3.3 percent this year and 5.6 percent in 2027. That bounce will rely on the quiet in the region. Both rating agencies and the Bank of Israel have stated that a viable plan to reduce debt is important. Watching Israel carefully, investors are also reading these reports and the level of trust in Israel's estimation of threats determines the risk premium they pay Israeli borrowers.

Jerusalem is not very comfortable playing the regional angle. It is being called an attempt by two of its key partners, Egypt and the UAE, to do right by the man was brushed aside. The Emirati leader apparently feared that an attack would have a negative effect on the Abraham Accords, and that is exactly what has occurred. The two states have refused to comment. That's the silence that leaves them options open and it's the silence that ensures Israel's neighbors will be monitoring Israel's new government, or old government, as the case may be, to see how it treats the evidence.