The crisis facing the world is not just a war front dilemma. It's going by oil tankers, fertiliser shipments, food prices, insurance premiums, sovereign debt and household budgets. Externals Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar's message at the inaugural Partners for Multilateralism, International Law, Peace and Prosperity Summit in New York was where the interconnected crisis of fuel, food, fertiliser and finance cannot be left to run without international guardrails.

That is a big formulation. It focuses the discussion not on the traditional war/diplomatic jargon but on economic security as the core of the global order. A missile could strike one target, and the fallout can lead to higher transport costs on continents, weaker currencies, more expensive fertiliser and food that is too costly for countries thousands of kilometers downwind.

The newest shipping movements highlight the risk. Likely traffic in the Strait of Hormuz was cut down to just two commodity vessels on Monday from ten the day before, reports said. Prior to the current war, the strait has been a gateway for about a fifth of the world's oil and liquefied natural gas. It also transported nearly one-third of all seaborne international trade in fertiliser, each year, nearly 16 million tonnes.

These are not "replaceable flows". The pressure will be eased by alternative pipelines and ports, but not the capacity, efficiency and cost structure of Hormuz. Saudi Arabia has resumed operations on its East-West pipeline that can transport around 4 million bpd to the Red Sea. But the rerouting itself illustrates the fragility that Jaishankar has referred to: a single point of passage, a single pipeline or a single port can be the weak link in the world economy.

The effects have already spread to crude oil. The futures for European diesel recently hit record prices and more than doubled since the start of 2026. During the first six months of the year, the Middle East exported an average of around 800,000 b/d of diesel compared with the previous year, when exports were twice as high. If diesel is becoming scarce, it reverberates throughout trucking, agriculture, construction, manufacturing and electricity generation.

Fertiliser is the link between energy crisis and food crisis. Natural gas is an energy source and an important feedstock for nitrogen fertilisers. Increased gas costs, shipping fees and war-risk insurance, therefore, increase the price of growing crops before it reaches supermarket shelves. Fuel, fertiliser and grain imports hitting three times, with countries dependent on imported fuel, fertiliser and grain driven three times by the import.

The fourth and least discussed aspect is finance. The developing economies are not in this crisis with an inexhaustible war chest. In 2026, the median developing country will pay approximately 9.5 per cent of government revenue on interest payments, double the rate 10 years ago. All developing countries could save an estimated $500 billion a year if they were allowed to borrow at rates close to those of the advanced countries.

Rather, it is worthwhile to note that many governments are indebted to borrow at punitive rates to support import of energy and food. If oil prices stay high, global fossil-fuel subsidies could be as high as $1.1 trillion in 2026. That budget has to be filled with money, typically from health, education, infrastructure or climate investment. The 4F crisis is not four parallel crises, then. It is a domino effect with fuel increasing the price of fertiliser, fertiliser increasing food costs and all three factors further eroding the financial security of import dependent countries.

In 2025, global trade remained at a record high at $35 trillion, growing by some 7.5 per cent. About nine per cent. more, in fact, was the increase in south-south trade. However those numbers contain a dangerous paradox. That economic interdependence is at an all-time high just as geopolitical cooperation is on the decline. There were 65 state-based armed conflicts reported in 35 countries in 2025 and overall military spending reached an estimated US$2.9 trillion.

The world is therefore spending record amounts on trade and record amounts on preparing for conflict, but the institutions which should be managing the collision are largely stuck in the 1945 power structure.

Hence, Jaishankar's call for "reformed multilateralism" must not be considered a "ceremonial call on a UN platform. A conflict can threaten world energy and food security and still keep the Security Council stuck in a "veto game". Fiscal discipline could be imposed on fragile countries by international financial institutions while the borrowing disadvantage is not corrected. Trade institutions can stand up to the disruption, but rarely have political power to prevent economic coercion or to guarantee critical sea lanes.

The solution cannot be the return to business as usual, that is, globalisation. Countries have experienced the effects of relying on too few suppliers or sources, relying on one currency, relying on one sea route, or relying on one financial system. Today de-risking and diversification are inevitable. What India did is not indecision in diplomacy but a multi-lane route with multiple energy relationships, strategic reserve expansion, and domestic manufacturing along with the simultaneous engagement of partners from the West, BRIC and other Global South countries. It's not just strategic, it's the right type of insurance strategy.

That is further reinforced by the first foreign ministers' meeting of the Visegrád Group and India at the UNGA. They backed India's permanent membership of the Security Council and agreed to hold an annual forum to discuss business, improved defence ties, technology cooperation, and more sustainable supply chains. The support comes from growing acknowledgment that India is not just a market, but has been marginalised from institutions which create rules for the world.

But there is a difference between being useful and another level of diplomatic show. New multilateral organizations will have a significant role only if they provide practical mechanisms, such as emergency coordination of fuel and fertiliser supplies, transparent shipping data, safeguarding of commercial shipping, development-finance guarantees, and consultation before sanctions or export restrictions have global impacts.