G-DF5N8YNBVV
top of page
Family Head

Popular Categories

Public Speaking Event

Politics

Image by Ibrahim Boran

Geo Economics

Image by Microsoft Copilot

Lifestyle

Image by UX Indonesia

Analysis

Image by John Salvino

Geopolitics

Urban Construction Scene

Civilizational Lens

Action Combat Scene

Defence

466e183e-c080-43d9-86ca-8ee0198036de.jfif

Pakistan’s BADR Defence Pact: Türkiye’s Arms Ambitions, Qatar’s Money and India’s BrahMos Challenge

22 Oct 2026

Created by

The BV Team

The defence pact recently signed by Pakistan with Türkiye, Qatar and Indonesia is more interesting from the perspective that it is an attempt to transform military ties into an economic and technological support system for Pakistan, not that it is a direct threat to India. The BADR Memorandum of Understanding involves four countries with varying strategic interests, industrial capacities and finance. What happens behind the diplomatic words is a possible game-changing drive to establish an interdependent defence manufacturing base from the Gulf to Southeast Asia.


The distinction matters. BADR is not a collective defence pact that imposes a duty on its members to intervene in conflict on each other's behalf. Its stated goals include joint manufacturing, defence research, technology cooperation, training and industrial development. However, military collaborations related to production sites, supply chains and technology transfer can become strategically significant for reasons other than the commercial use.


The allure is clear for Pakistan. Islamabad has been heavily dependent on Chinese military technology for decades, and it has been doing so since the time of the use of Chinese missiles in the 1990s. It has led to access to relatively inexpensive weaponry, but also to centralization of procurement and maintenance, and technological exposure, within one principal supplier relationship. There is also an opportunity for unmanned systems, naval technology and electronic warfare in Türkiye, as well as in other areas of aerospace engineering.


Meanwhile, Ankara has its own business maths. Türkiye has put significant effort into building up its defence sector, creating drones, precision weapons, naval vessels and armoured machines that can compete with those from other world powers. Pakistan offers an established military customer, Indonesia a large potential market and Qatar financial strength and its ongoing need for advanced security solutions.


As per SIPRI's estimate on international arms transfers during 2021-25, Pakistan was in the list of the top 10 importers of major arms with China accounting for about 40% of the major arms imports to Pakistan. Diversification would therefore be an extensive change in procurement and while it would be expensive and technically complex to replace established Chinese systems would be difficult.


Pakistan cannot replace the Turkish parts in all the Chinese platforms. The cost of aircraft integration, radar compatibility, software architecture, and weapons certification and maintenance infrastructure is significant. Years of investment, financing and industrial coordination would be necessary to any serious diversification program.


The commercial potential for the country is also great. In 2024, Turkey's defence and aerospace exports amounted to more than $7 billion, showcasing the sector's growing global presence. BADR has the potential to provide Ankara with production partnerships, export customers and the possibility of spreading manufacturing tasks among multiple countries.


The position of Qatar is unique. It is a potential investor and supplier of Western countries due to its financial resources, defence expenditure and relations with western suppliers. But currently there is no publicly confirmed BADR investment fund, procurement commitment or package to finance the multimillion-dollar package. Any idea of the automatic funding of Pakistan's military modernization via Doha is still premature.


Jakarta has stepped up the defence cooperation with India and added to an arrangement that includes Pakistan. In July 2026, when the two countries had a meeting with PM Narendra Modi, India and Indonesia formalised missile arrangements valued at some $630 million, which included both BrahMos coastal-defence systems and an air-to-air missile programme related to Astra.


This makes for an odd strategic dynamic. Indonesia can buy Indian missiles for strengthening maritime deterrence and work together with Pakistan and Türkiye on other defence industrial projects.


Overlapping partnerships are not mutually exclusive. Indonesia has known a traditional preference for strategic autonomy, a relationship with competing powers, instead of exclusive military alliances. Its defence procurement decisions are driven more by the geography and the needs for maritime security than by ideology, and by availability of financing and technology.


The commercial aspect, however, raises some valid questions on IP protection, technology security, and limitation of third party access in New Delhi.


BrahMos is no ordinary export product. It is a complex industrial cooperation between India and Russia, and a crucial part of India's defence exports policy. It provides more than just the missile; it encompasses all electronics, maintenance, training, logistics, and long-term technological support.


Former Chief of BrahMos Aerospace Sudhir Kumar Mishra has been vocal about the inclusion of safeguards in the arrangements for Indonesia that ensure sensitive technology and IP. Those are protections that are vital but need to be backed up by contractual enforcement, access control and on-going security cooperation.


No explicit proof that Indonesia is planning to sell the Indian missile technology to Pakistan. Linking BADR membership to technology leakage would thus be too early.


The larger competition is becoming more of an economic affair. The defence exports of India grew at a record high of ₹38,424 crore for FY2025–26, up by 62.66% from ₹23,622 crore in FY2024–25. Domestic defence production also was about ₹1.78 lakh crore. The figures show that New Delhi is making an effort to establish an industrial alternative to the established arms suppliers from other countries.


But, in Turkey the pace is quickening. Its defense and aerospace exports were more than $10 billion in 2025, and the growing industrial network of the country is a solid base for multinational manufacturing. BADR may benefit Turkish manufacturers by providing access to Asian and Gulf markets and offer them the benefit of shared development costs and more customers.


China is still playing a role. It is not in Beijing's interest to give up Pakistan's defence market, especially in the context of its broader military cooperation agreement with Islamabad. It is unclear if Chinese suppliers would be welcoming for increased Turkish involvement in sensitive Pakistani programmes. There may be some competition among suppliers that will strengthen the negotiating position of Pakistan, however, it may be possible that such competition can lead to higher cost for Pakistan due to incompatibility of technologies.


The timing of BADR is indicative of broader concerns over American security guarantees, the challenges of regional uncertainty and the significance of domestic defence manufacturing. But it does not have the same strategic objectives amongst the four signatories. Türkiye is a NATO member, while Qatar has a long history of security cooperation with the United States, Indonesia cherishes its diplomatic autonomy, and Pakistan has strong security ties with China.


For India, it is neither a cause for alarm nor a cause for indifference. New Delhi needs to safeguard the sensitive technologies, increase its defence ties with Indonesia and the Gulf countries and push the competitiveness of the domestic defence industry.

bottom of page