One rule applies to Benjamin Netanyahu when Washington is on the verge of doing something he doesn't like. He refuses to actively protest it, at least, not yet. He then embraces it, takes some credit for it, and uses as much time as he has left to tinker with it and make it livable. What we witnessed Friday afternoon in Jerusalem was textbook.

Netanyahu's office released a statement that said he and Donald Trump are in “complete agreement” that Iran must not have nuclear weapons and that “as long as I am prime minister of Israel, Iran will not have nuclear weapons.” Fine words. However, they came hours after Trump, without consulting Jerusalem, declared that a deal with Tehran was in the offing and could be signed this weekend in Europe. Netanyahu wasn't part of that announcement. He was chasing it. That is the real story, that difference between the optics and reality.

How we got here

The conflict between the United States and Iran that is playing out this week is not a new one. American and Israeli forces launched a synchronized military operation against Iranian targets as a whole, including military strikes against nuclear facilities, on Feb. 28 of this year. In April, a tenuous ceasefire ensued. Then it collapsed. The tiny coral island of Kharg in the Persian Gulf, which handles about 90% of Iran's crude oil exports, was attacked by U.S. forces. Trump even threatened to take over the island.

That order of priorities is important because it indicates what Tehran is trading from: real military and economic agony, as well as steadfast resistance. Since March 4, Iran has maintained the Strait of Hormuz formally closed, a move that has huge consequences for world trade. About 27% of the world's maritime crude oil traffic goes through that chokepoint. The closure has been rocking the world's energy markets for months, wreaking havoc on shipping insurance costs and dealing with shipping chain jams that manufacturers and importers from Tokyo to Rotterdam continue to deal with. Iran has a production capacity of more than three million barrels per day. With its potential for destruction sending oil prices to levels not seen since early pandemic months, some analysts have dubbed Kharg Island "the main node" of the Iranian economy, as it handles the crude from some of the country's biggest oil fields.

In such a context, Trump Thursday night announced that he was suspending planned strikes because the Iranian leadership had "approved" an agreement. He spoke of documents being in "pretty final shape" and a signing in Europe. The Strait of Hormuz will be reopened immediately after signing," he said. Iran indicated there has yet to be a final decision made. Netanyahu's office dubbed the emerging text an "MoU regarding entry into negotiations" a framework for a framework. That is a very deliberate choice of language.

What Israel desires, and why this is not enough

The Israeli position calls for Iran to remove all enriched uranium from its territory, Iran to dismantle enrichment facilities, curbs in Iran's ballistic missile program, and Iran to stop financing proxy groups in Lebanon, Gaza, Syria, and Yemen. Over the last few weeks, Trump has essentially abandoned three of those four in the negotiating room.

Netanyahu's office recognized "Israel is not a party to the memorandum of understanding" but stated that Trump assured that a final deal would include all four elements. The magic words in that are "final agreement. The MoU being discussed is not the final agreement. It's a ceasefire period in which negotiations will take place. It is a meaningfully different thing, and anyone who has seen Iran go through diplomatic processes in the last 20 years knows why this is important.

Friday's reports by Iranian media confirm that Tehran will not back down on its right to enrich uranium in any negotiations and that the missile program and proxy groups are not even on the agenda. The US reportedly desires freeze in Iran's enrichment for 20 years. Iran has agreed five. This 15-year difference is no mere coincidence. This is the difference between a verification-robust disarmament and a temporary pause before the cycle repeats.

This is the enrichment problem the entire game.

The JCPOA had verifiable limits on Iran's nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief during the Obama administration. The deal was short-lived, as the first Trump administration walked away in 2018, even as Iran adhered to the deal's terms. The years between saw Iran progress its nuclear know-how and amass significant enriched uranium reserves. In 2023, IAEA inspectors found uranium dust with an 83.7% enrichment at Fordow, which is below the about 90% level that is generally regarded as weapons-grade. In June 2025, talks broke down, leading to a Twelve-Day war with the United States targeting Iran's nuclear facilities. The present war has been started since February, 2026.

The sites of Natanz, Fordow and Isfahan were hit and damaged to varying extents, in the nuclear sector. But knowledge, the designs for the centrifuge, the trained scientific staff none of that can be bombed away. By any credible estimate of Iranian intelligence, the time needed to produce enough fissile material for a weapon Iran's breakout capability remains short. That is why the length of time for enrichment isn't an academic exercise. The five-year ban is in effect, technically bringing Iran back into enrichment business before this decade is over. The twenty-year ban will allow a generation to develop alternative regional security mechanisms and verification systems. Israel has been working on this file for 30 years. Netanyahu knows his sums. It's not too much to say he's in "full agreement" with Trump; that's a viable abstraction. The problem is that abstractions don't hold up to negotiating texts.

The economic risks no one is saying loud enough

The impact of any deal, or lack, will be felt economically beyond the region. The impact of the Strait of Hormuz disruption has already been felt. OPEC+ has decided to boost production quotas to soften the impact, but this is only part of a solution to a structural issue. What's needed is not a ceasefire on the bombs but a lasting political solution.

According to Iranian sources, the draft U.S. agreement would free $24 billion in Iranian assets that have been frozen. It's a matter of economic motivation for Tehran. It's also leverage Tehran can walk away from if terms get harder. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are looking on with a mix of relief and caution: Relief, because it will be easier to plan their budgets if the Strait settles, and caution, because a deal that doesn't dismantle Iran's proxy network in the area changes a balance they have worked hard to maintain over the years. Turkey's Erdogan has even sounded a warning in public that Israeli strikes on Lebanon and Syria pose a risk to Turkish interests, signaling that there are wider repercussions to this war than just between the two main actors.

IAEA board this week called on Tehran to provide reports on its uranium stocks and reopen facilities for inspectors. That demand will be the true litmus paper for whether any emerging deal features any meaningful verification, or simply a smokescreen, with arms control verbiage added.

The honest assessment

The structure of the problem is clearly understood. The US is keen to reach a deal before momentum for the strikes fades in its own country. Iran is desperate for sanctions relief, and its frozen assets, to the point of engaging in serious negotiations, but not desperate enough to give up enrichment rights, missiles, or proxies. Israel is calling for either no deal or a deal so complete that it is tantamount to no deal for Iran's nuclear aspirations. There are no complete matches for the three positions in the time frame under consideration.

Netanyahu's claim on Friday of "complete agreement" and the 30-year history and the promise that Iran will not have nuclear weapons while he is in power was not a policy statement. It was positioning. He is reserving his options to take credit, should the final outcome prove better than the current MoU suggests, or to point fingers elsewhere, should he actually end up with Iran's nuclear programme more or less intact. The consequences are not merely strategic, but existential for him personally, as Israeli elections are months away, and his whole political career is on the line with the Iran file.

Just the gap between the US and Iran's positions on enrichment time is an indication this process is far from over. Whether it will land somewhere more durable for energy markets, for regional stability, or for the Iranian nuclear weapons issue, a cornerstone of Middle East geopolitics for a generation is truly up for grabs. A signed MoU this weekend would be only a pudding, not a solution.