Almost three years after Hamas militants ripped through the Gaza border fence, Israel is facing a fresh, and devastating, dilemma: What if Benjamin Netanyahu had had 10 days' notice, in the clearest of languages, and merely decided not to do anything about it?

Haaretz journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval, who are researching the hostage crisis for their upcoming book, say they have uncovered evidence that the UAE President, Mohammed bin Zayed, personally phoned the Israeli prime minister in late September 2023 to alert him that Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar was making a “big move.” The report said Sinwar had instructed a Fatah intermediary to convey a message to the Israelis that he was preparing a "big surprise" (the Arabic term for 'earthquake') and that discussions concerning the stalled prisoner releases must proceed or otherwise there would be repercussions. The message made it to an adviser of bin Zayed, who reportedly was too scared to give the message to Shin Bet himself and instead passed it through to Abu Dhabi. The Emirati leader, who was concerned Israeli intelligence services could already receive the signal without understanding the degree, picked up the phone right away.

The call, delivered via a "dedicated secure communications channel used by the Emirates to communicate with Jerusalem," lasted an hour and a half but the report said it resulted in a "striking casual response. Netanyahu told bin Zayed that Israel had Gaza "under control" and that any difficulty was more likely to arise in the West Bank with Israel ready for whatever happens, it is said. He allegedly never briefed then-Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar and then IDF chief of staff Herzi Halevi on the content of the call. Both men have said to Haaretz that they were never told. Netanyahu, however, deflected instead of decided and didn't refer to his talk with the Emirati president when Bar took to the air again, on Oct. 1, to launch what the report termed "preemptive strikes" on Hamas' leadership.

The prime minister's office has flatly denied the claim, saying it was a "total lie" and that it never had such a conversation with the UAE leader during that time. None of that denial has helped to slow down the political storm. Former IDF chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot, who leads the Yashar party, accused Netanyahu of "leading the country into catastrophe blindly" and vowed a state inquiry "on day one of a new government.

Naftali Bennett, who made the issue of Netanyahu's culpability for the October 7 attack a cornerstone of his campaign, described himself as "satisfied" with the report, and asserted that the sitting premier was guilty of "criminal negligence" because he was spending those final days trying to calm Gaza instead of mobilizing the security establishment. Yair Golan was even more radical, claiming the prime minister's seat "should be in prison for his crimes against the State of Israel. None of the three could point to a more reliable alternative for verification of a private diplomatic call, and this rift between certainty and evidence will only be a subplot until the story unfolds further.

It's the timing that makes the allegation fit so heavily. But as the country goes to the polls this year it remains bitterly divided over who is to blame for the worst single day in its history and a Channel 12 poll released the same morning suggests the electorate was essentially split evenly, with about 10 per cent still undecided as to how to vote and the intentions of voters in each bloc differing widely. The revelation made against Netanyahu in particular, and not the military or intelligence bureaucracy in general, alters the nature of that argument. No longer systemic failure. It's a tale of one man's telephone call.

The claim also adds to Israel's rocky diplomatic situation at this juncture. In 2020, the UAE hosted the launching of the Abraham Accords and it was among the things that bin Zayed feared an unchecked Hamas operation could destroy. As well as cautioning a partner, Abu Dhabi was attempting to defend its strategic investment in the relationship. That detail will be key for Gulf capitals in evaluating Jerusalem's reliability in the future as they absorb other jolts, such as Saudi energy facilities being attacked and set ablaze by Houthis the same morning, and Iranian state media claiming that a new solid-fuel ballistic missile, the Qassem Basir, marks a doctrine of preemptive strikes against perceived threats, days after Washington said it struck three Iranian oil tankers after they fired missiles into American ships.

Israel is also taking a distinct, albeit indirect hit economically. Britain has revealed Tuesday that it will formally ban goods from West Bank settlements, as Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband explains that this will help "to protect a viable two-state solution. Bilateral trade between the UK and Israel is approximately £6 billion per year, with about £3.5 billion of exports going into the UK from Israel, and £2.5 billion coming from the UK to Israel, and settlement goods, mainly wine and fresh produce, are a small proportion of this trade.

The direct financial impact will be limited. The signal is not: Spain, Ireland and the Netherlands have already imposed settlement restrictions and Canada and France are said to be considering their own measures, along with London. The finance minister, Bezalel Smotrich, has demanded the expulsion of Britain's ambassador and a Florida congressman threatened to impose the same on any British company complying with the ban in his state. It's a glimpse of what a dispute over settlements might escalate into more of a trade war between allies—before the first delivery of wine is denied entry at a British port.

The warning and the trade deal cover the same same thing: the test of a government that was once the trusted blue chipper of its foreign affairs is now being subjected to a series of doubts about judgment at the top.