Washington is readying itself for another massive assault on Iran, and American military planners are reportedly working on a plan for a “highly focused” 72-hour campaign targeting Iranian missile sites, drone bases, energy facilities and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) command centres. The preparations have come at a critical time as President Donald Trump is making diplomatic strides with Tehran and rejecting new U.S. military attacks ahead of November's midterm elections.

The latest suggestion is just the latest of six big military options now under consideration by Trump, according to The New York Times, which has been followed up by The Times of Israel. Five previous offers, all relating to Iran or Yemen's Houthis, were rejected. Vice President JD Vance and high-level national security officials at Camp David reportedly heard about the latest contingency.

The separation between military planning versus political authorization continues to be important. There has been no official public statement of a decision to run the proposed operation. But the scope of the preparations indicates that Washington wishes to have the option of making a quick move should negotiations with Tehran fall apart or if Tehran's actions become a risk to the American presence or regional allies or commercial shipping.

The proposed campaign would reportedly focus on Iran's reconstructed missile and unmanned aerial systems, which have long been at the heart of Tehran's military strategy and have been the target of months of confrontation. American planners are also considering measures to target energy infrastructure and Revolutionary Guard command facilities.

A 3-day campaign is not a 3-day conflict, however. The destruction of fixed installations is significantly more difficult than wiping out scattered missile launch pads, underground storage facilities, mobile command centers, and drone manufacturing plants. Iran has been working on military capabilities to withstand attacks from technologically superior opponents for decades.

This leaves Washington with a tricky operational calculation. The punishing start may weaken Iran's ability to launch coordinated strikes, but may also trigger counterattacks against U.S. military bases, Israeli cities, Gulf oil infrastructure and foreign shipping.

The Pentagon's reported preparations should be viewed in the broader context of its overall strategy to limit Iran's capacity to impose economic and military costs on the United States while not engaging in another extended regional conflict.

The marine aspect is also very important. The USS Theodore Roosevelt carrier strike group is reportedly en route to the Middle East, and will likely arrive with three aircraft carriers in the region for the first time since 2003. This would give them quite a bit of airpower, surveillance and defense, but not necessarily that they're about to be attacked.

The first contrariness is with Trump's political rhetoric. He on October 8 declared that American military forces would not attack Iran before the midterm elections and said indirect negotiations are productive. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also made the point that exchanges were ongoing through intermediaries and that Tehran was studying Washington's answers to an Iranian proposal that was called a "seven-day plan.

Diplomatic opening is still precarious. Washington wants Iran to be limited in its nuclear ambitions and for the Strait of Hormuz to become more secure. Tehran, however, is standing by while demanding that the conditions it deems unpalatable to its sovereignty and security be met.

The United States has also ramped up economic sanctions. On October 8th, the Treasury Department announced new sanctions against 17 ships suspected of being involved in Iranian oil shipments to Asian markets. Military readiness, maritime enforcement and financial sanctions have become the tools of American pressure that are now working in a connected manner.

Economic impacts are already evident. Trump said that strikes wouldn't be allowed to resume before the elections, soaking up the price jump of the previous day, which saw the price of Brent crude climb above $105 per barrel for a few moments. Reuters reported on October 9 that prices for both Brent and West Texas Intermediate were at levels near $102.58 and $90.41 respectively. The volatility shows how a political statement can affect energy prices without there being a difference in the physical supply of energy.

The main area of concern is still the Strait of Hormuz. Prior to the war, about 20% of the world's oil and LNG supplies were transiting through this narrow strait.Before the war, about 20% of the world's oil and LNG flows went through this narrow strait. In recent incidents, there have been maritime incidents which have increased insurance rates, interfered with tanker transfers and made refinery supply plans much more complex. According to a report in the Financial Times, flows had dropped again from a brief recovery to around 11 million barrels a day, with one day of the week seeing around four million barrels.

For Iran, this disruption gives them bargaining power that a traditional military comparison cannot. Tehran doesn't have to beat the United States Navy to cause economic harm. Continuous uncertainty regarding commercial shipping can lead to higher freight rates, affects energy security and puts political strain on governments thousands of kilometres removed.

This is due to renewed Houthi attacks against Saudi Arabia making the regional situation more dangerous. Three Saudis were killed and commercial aviation infrastructure has been damaged by strikes on the airport in Riyadh, Reuters reported on October 9. Saudi-backed forces have reacted, raiding Houthi bases in Yemen. This establishes a second chokepoint in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb, which could impact trade between the Asia and Europe.

Israel has a strategic calculation of its own. Preventing Iran from developing a nuclear weapons capability, and from rebuilding its missile capability, are its top priorities. Gulf governments, on the other hand, have to balance Iran's threat with the massive economic losses of the next escalation. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have made significant efforts to become trade, aviation, finance and energy hubs for the world. Those hopes are at risk of being lost due to long-term instability.

China is also very interested. Beijing is a large energy importer and trading partner of Iran and the Gulf economies, which enjoy uninterrupted shipping and predictable oil prices. Russia may see improvements in its energy income but such broader instability adds to its own diplomatic and trade difficulties.

The impact is especially severe for India. According to official Indian data, crude dependence has risen to 88.6% for the April-December period of FY2025-26, of which the Middle East accounted for 46.9% of crude imports. This translates into an additional $18–20 billion in India's import bill at $10 per barrel of oil, and volumes will determine the exact impact of such a price hike. This will drive up inflation, transport prices, industrial margins, and the current account.