The Left-Wing Extremists have carved out a niche for themselves in India and the long battle against them has now reached a critical stage, however, the complete elimination of the armed Maoists cannot compensate for the economic isolation, human suffering and violence that occurred over 50 years. The Union Home Minister Amit Shah's recent comments about reconstruction in Bastar also reflect an important change in government's priorities from uprooting networks of insurgent groups to livelihoods; from rehabilitating victims; from putting some of the most neglected tribal areas of India on the economic map.

In his address to a rehabilitation programme virtually on Thursday, Shah recognized that the struggle against Naxalism was a part of a much bigger responsibility that is on the national agenda. The tribal communities have suffered displacement, limited economic opportunities, poor infrastructure, and a lack of security for generations. Peace will have meaning for these communities only as it becomes a reality in terms of operational schools, reachable hospitals, jobs, financial inclusion, and reliable public services.

The first and immediate task is to provide assistive devices to the people with disabilities including the victims of Maoists violence. The programme conducted in Jagdalpur from 5th–7th October reached out to over 3600 people - about 1,570 of which were in Bastar. People affected by disability and years of poor access to specialist health care are now getting artificial limbs, wheelchairs, hearing aids and mobility equipment needed to help them in everyday life.

But the economic and administrative restructuring envisioned for the former bastions of Chhattisgarh's insurgencies is more important than Shah's move.

The government's rehabilitation figures show not only the progress made, but how much is yet to be done. About 8,526 Maoists have surrendered and nearly 7,500 people who had no bank account have been issued accounts, Shah said. Another 1,625 beneficiaries had received reward payments, 7,882 had been given incentive payments, 455 had secured employment and 129 had been given land allotments. The figures are for various categories of assistance and are not necessarily mutually exclusive categories.

Maoist groups have long capitalised on the relative weak administrative control in the forest areas of the central and eastern parts of India. Security forces were ambushed, civilians were coerced, and operational challenges were high in infrastructure projects. Armed rebels often denied the Indian state access to roads, telecommunication networks, electricity networks and banking services in the settlements they attacked.

The economic impact was much wider than just the areas of fighting. The high cost of transport, lack of private investment, disruption of agricultural trade and the difficulties faced by local businesses were all attributed to insecurity. There was a diversion of government resources that were needed for education, healthcare and productive infrastructure for long duration of security operations.

The state of Chhattisgarh has huge mineral resources such as iron ore and coal and limestone, which is why stability is crucial for India's industrial goals. Bastar's mineral bounty also raises a policy issue: will renewed commercial activity bring long-term prosperity to tribal communities or will it increase the extraction of minerals without providing meaningful local benefits?

The outcome will be determined by the way mining revenues are handled, jobs created and environmental protections and community rights are upheld. Security can be a boost to the investment climate, but investment can by itself not guarantee equitable development. Economic reconstruction in the region must be put on a central focus of local processing industries, forest produce businesses, transport and vocational training.

The government is floating a major administrative restructuring. Security camps set up to tackle Maoist movement are likely to be converted into service delivery centres, providing health, education, employment and community development services. This would short the physical gap between remote villages and necessary government offices, as long as they are staffed with qualified staff, properly funded and monitored regularly.

There's also a political factor. Shah had a point to make when he blamed previous Congress-led governments for their failure to provide basic amenities, and he was right to bill the BJP government for its security and development policies as a corrective. These kinds of arguments will continue to be politically active. The region's situation has been influenced by historical under-development, challenging topography, governance failures, and conflicts over land and forest rights, as well as insurgent activity.

However, the main question does not boil down to competing political narratives. Armed groups that resorted to intimidation and violence to attack democratic institutions also handicapped the normal aspirations of communities which they purport to represent. The restoration of constitutional governance should, therefore, go together with tangible improvement in day-to-day lives.

The rehabilitation of ex-Maoists is also important. Indicators of insurgent capacity deterioration are surrender statistics, but continued success will depend on continued reintegration. Ex-combatants require skills and job security, as well as their acceptance within the community. Economic discontent and local grievances, if they are not addressed, can provide the opportunity for the emergence of new extremist networks.

Some of the initiatives, like Bastar Olympics, Bastar Pandum and Niyad Nellanar scheme, have significance beyond cultural and welfare objectives. Collective life that has been destroyed through decades of violence can be revived through sports, tribal festivals, and better facilities for the village.

The lessons learnt from India are also relevant for countries grappling with internal insurgencies. Strong armed movements can be disrupted by military and policing actions, but lasting peace requires the development of legitimate institutions and increased economic opportunities by the state. The experiences of Colombia and the Philippines show that it can be challenging to go from armed conflict to civilian reconstruction.